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Abstract
We show unconditionally that the existence of commitment schemes implies the existence of
constant-round non-malleable commitments; earlier protocols required additional assumptions
such as collision resistant hash functions or subexponential one-way functions.
Our protocol also satisfies the stronger notions of concurrent non-malleability and robustness.
As a corollary, we establish that constant-round secure multi-party computation can be based
on only enhanced trapdoor permutations; also here, earlier protocols additionally required either
collision-resistant hash functions or subexponential one-way functions.
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1 Introduction
Commitment schemes are one of the most fundamental cryptographic building blocks. Often de-
scribed as the “digital” analogue of sealed envelopes, commitment schemes enable a sender to
commit itself to a value while keeping it secret from the receiver. This property is called hid-
ing. Furthermore, the commitment is binding, and thus in a later stage when the commitment is
opened, it is guaranteed that the “opening” can yield only a single value determined in the com-
mitting stage. Their applications range from coin flipping [Blu83] to the secure computation of
any efficiently computable function [GMW91, GMW87]. In light of their importance, commitment
schemes have received a considerable amount of attention. This has resulted in a fairly comprehen-
sive understanding of the hardness assumptions under which they can be realized; in particular, by
the results of Naor [Nao91] and H˚astad et al [HILL99, Nao91], the existence of one-way functions
implies the existence of two-round commitments.
For many applications, however, the most basic security guarantees of commitments are not
sufficient. For instance, the basic definition of commitments does not rule out an attack where
an adversary, upon seeing a commitment to a specific value v, is able to commit to a related
value (say, v − 1), even though it does not know the actual value of v. This kind of attack
might have devastating consequences if the underlying application relies on the independence of
committed values (e.g., consider a case in which the commitment scheme is used for securely
implementing a contract bidding mechanism). Indeed, for the general task of secure multi-party
computation [GMW87], such independence is cruicial. The state of affairs is even worsened by
the fact that many of the known commitment schemes are actually susceptible to this kind of
attack. In order to address the above concerns, Dolev, Dwork and Naor (DDN) introduced the
concept of non-malleable commitments [DDN00]. Loosely speaking, a commitment scheme is said
to be non-malleable if it is infeasible for an adversary to “maul” a commitment to a value v into a
commitment to a related value v˜.
More precisely, we consider a man-in-the-middle (MIM) attacker that participates in two con-
current execution of a commitment scheme 〈C,R〉; in the “left” execution it interacts with an honest
committer (running C); in the “right” execution it interacts with an honest receiver (running R).
Additionally, we assume that the players have n-bit identities (where n is polynomially related to
the security parameter), and that the commitment protocol depends only on the identity of the
committer; we sometimes refer to this as the identity of the interaction. Intuitively, 〈C,R〉 being
non-malleable means that if the identity of the right interaction is different than the identity of
the left interaction (i.e., A does not use the same identity as the left committer), the value A
commits to on the right does not depend on the value it receives a commitment to on the left; this
is formalized by requiring that for any two values v1, v2, the values A commits to after receiving
left commitments to v1 or v2 are indistinguishable.
The first non-malleable commitment protocol was constructed by Dolev, Dwork and Naor [DDN00]
in 1991. The security of their protocol relies on the minimal assumption of one-way functions and
requires O(log n) rounds of interaction, where n ∈ N is the length of party identities. Non-malleable
commitments have since been extensively studied in the literature; the main question has been to
determine the number of communication rounds needed for non-malleable commitments. Let us
briefly survey some of this literature.
1.1 The State of the Art of Non-malleable Commitments
As mentioned, the original work by DDN assumes only one-way functions, and considers the “plain”
model of execution; that is, there is no trusted infrastructure. DiCrenenzo, Ishai and Ostrovsky
[CKOS01] and follow-up work in e.g., [CKOS01, CIO01, CF01, FF09, DG03] showed how to im-
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prove the round-complexity of the DDN construction when assuming the existence of some trusted
infrastructure; in particular, in such models non-interactive (i.e., single message) non-malleable
commitments based on only one-way function are known [DG03]. The first improvment to the
round-complexity of the DDN construction without any trusted infrastructure came more than a
decade later. Following the ground-breaking work by Barak on non-black-box simulation [Bar01],
in 2002, Barak [Bar02] presented a constant-round protocol for non-malleable commitments; the
security of this protocol however relies on the existence of trapdoor permutations and hash func-
tions that are collision-resistant against circuits of sub-exponential size. A few years later, Pass
and Rosen [PR05b] (relying on a technique from Pass [Pas04]), showed that collision resistant hash
functions secure against polynomially-sized circuits are sufficient to obtain a constant-round proto-
col. Pandey, Pass and Vaikuntanathan [PPV08] next provided a construction of a non-interactive
non-malleable commitment based on a new hardness assumption with a strong non-malleability
flavour; in contrast to the earlier constant-round constructions, their protocol has a black-box
proof of security.
Last year, Lin and Pass (LP) [LP09] showed a O(1)log
∗ n-round protocol that is based on the
existence of one-way functions and uses a black-box proof of security. Subsequent work by Pass and
Wee [PW10] obtained a constant-round protocol based on sub-exponetially hard one-way functions
(again using a black-box proof of security). Finally, a very recent work by Wee improved the
round-complexity of the LP protocol to O(log∗ n)-rounds, again based on one-way functions.1
So, summarizing the state of the art, we have:
• Based on the minimal assumption of (polynomially-hard) one-way functions, the best proto-
cols require O(log∗)-rounds and have black-box proofs of security.
• Constant-round protocols are known based on either collision-resistant hashfunctions (and
using a non-black-box proofs of security), or subexponetially hard one-way functions (using
a black-box proof of security).
1.2 Settling the Round-complexity of Non-malleable Commitments
In this work, we settle the round-complexity of non-malleable commitments: we present a constant-
round protocol that is based on the assumption of (polynomially-hard) one-way functions and does
not use any trusted infrastructure. Since the existence of commitment schemes already implies the
existence of one-way functions [IL89] we thus have:
Theorem 1. Assume the existence of a commitment scheme. Then there exists a constant-round
non-malleable commitment scheme with a black-box proof of security.
Concurrent non-malleability As mentioned, the original notion of non-malleability considers
an MIM attacker participating in a single execution on the left and a single execution on the right.
Already the original DDN paper suggested that a stronger notion of non-malleability—concurrent
non-malleability—where the MIM may participate in an unbounded number of executions on both
the left and the right, is desirable. Pass and Rosen [PR05a] provided the first construction of a
concurrently non-malleable commitment scheme; their scheme only has a constant number of rounds
but relies on the existence of claw-free permutations (and non-black-box techniques). Subsequently,
1In the journal version of [LP09], we point out that a slight tweak of the orignal LP protocol in fact also yields a
O(log∗ n)-round protocol. However, as we discuss further in Section 1.6, Wee’s protocol has other desirable features—
namely, it can be used to obtain a black-box construction of secure multi-party computation based on various different
primitives.
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Lin, Pass and Venkitasubramaniam [LPV08] provided an O(n)-round construction based on one-
way functions. Finally, the LP protocol and its derivates [PW10, Wee10] yield a O(log∗)-round
protocol based on one-way functions, or a constant-round protocol based on subexponential one-
way functions. As we show, our protocol is also concurrently non-malleable.
Robust Non-malleability Lin and Pass [LP09] recently introduced the notion of robust non-
malleable commitments. Roughly speaking, whereas non-malleability considers a scenario where a
MIM participates in the same commitment protocol on the left and the right, r-robustness considers
a notion of non-malleability for commitments where the MIM attacker participates in any arbitrary
r-round protocol on the left, and the commitment protocol on the right. Robustness is useful when
using non-malleable commitments as subprotocols within larger protocols. As we show, for any
constant r, our protocol can be made r-robust while still remaining constant-round.
Thus summarizing the above discussion, we have:
Theorem 2. Assume the existence of a commitment scheme. Then for any constant r, there exists
a constant-round commitment scheme that is r-robust concurrently non-malleable with a black-box
proof of security.
1.3 Applications to Secure Multi-party Computation
As mentioned, “independence” of inputs is crucial for secure multi-party computation protocols.
Indeed, there has been a tight interplay between work on the round-complexity of multi-party
computation and work on non-malleable commitments.
Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson’s [GMW91] original work on secure multi-party computation
showed a O(m)-round multi-party computation protocol based on the existence of enhanced trap-
door permutations (TDPs), where m is the number of players in the execution; implicit in their
work is a O(n)-round non-malleable commitment for the special case of so-called “synchronizing”
adversaries that have identities of length log n. Subsequent works improved the round-complexity
by making stronger assumptions. Katz, Ostrovsky, and Smith [KOS03] obtained a O(logm)-round
protocol assuming TDPs and dense-crypto systems by relying on the non-malleable commitments
from [DDN00]. By additionally assuming the existence of hash-function collision-resistant against
circuits of sub-exponential size (and non-black-box techniques), they also obtained a O(1)-round
protocol by instead relying on the non-malleable commitment from [Bar02]. More recently, Pass
[Pas04], showed the existence of a O(1)-rounds protocol assuming only TDPs and (standard) col-
lision resistant hash functions (but still using non-black box techniques); this technique in turned
was used in the non-malleable commitment of [PR05a].
The implicit connection between the round-complexity of non-malleable commitments and se-
cure multi-party was formalized by Lin, Pass and Venkitasubramaniam in [LPV09]: they show that
the existence of k-round 4-robust non-malleable commitments and the existence of TDPs implies
the existence of O(k)-round secure multi-party computation. All the more recent constructions of
non-malleable commitments [LP09, PW10, Wee10] are robust, and thus as a consequence, the state
of the art of secure multi-party computation was the same as for non-malleable commitments.
Combining the result of [LPV09] with Theorem 2, we get that secure multi-party computations
can be performed in a constant number of round based on only TDPs.
Theorem 3. Assume the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations. Then there exists a constant-
round protocol for secure multi-party computation.
Remark 1. Although we haven’t verified all the details, it would seem that the TDP assumption
can be weakened to only assume the existence of a constant-round honest-but-curious OT protocol.
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1.4 Applications to Non-malleable Zero-knowledge
Non-malleable zero-knowledge [DDN00] consider the execution of zero-knowledge protocols in the
presence of a MIM attacker. Roughly speaking, a zero-knowledge protocol is non-malleable if the
MIM attacker can only provide convincing right-interaction proofs of statements that it could have
proved without participating in the left interaction. The recent result of [LPTV10] shows that
the existence of k-round 4-robust non-malleable commitments implies the existence of O(k)-round
non-malleable zero-knowledge arguments for NP. By combining their results with Theorem 2
we directly have that the existence of one-way functions implies the existence a constant-round
zero-knowledge argument for NP.
Theorem 4. Assume the existence of one-way functions. Then there exists a constant-round non-
malleable black-box zero-knowledge argument for NP with a black-box proof of security.
1.5 A New Technique: “Message-scheduling in the head”
The main idea underlying all non-malleable commitment schemes is to “encode” the identity of
the committer into the protocol. At the very least, this ensure that unless the attacker copies the
identity of the left committer, the attacker cannot simply forward messages between the left and
the right executions. But we also need to ensure that the attacker cannot in a clever way maul the
messages it receives on the left so they become useful on the right. For instance, in the original
DDN construction, the identity is encoded into the scheduling of messages in the protocol; on a
very high-level (and oversimplifying), the idea is to ensure that at some point in the execution, the
MIM must “speak” while only receiving “useless” messages. The problem with this approach is
that it requires a high round-complexity.
We will revisit the DDN approach. The main idea behind our scheme is to perform the message
scheduling “in the head”. A bit more precisely, our protocol follows the “simulation-soundness”
paradigm of Sahai [Sah99], first used in the context of CCA-secure encryption, and next used by
Pass and Rosen [PR05a] and Lin and Pass [LP09] in the context of non-malleable commitments;
that is, the main component of our construction is a method for enabling us to “simulate” the left
interaction, while ensure that the right interaction remains “sounds”. Towards this, we embedd a
“trapdoor” into the protocol which depends on the identity of the interaction; proving simulation-
soundness then essentially amounts to showing that there exists a way to recover the trapdoor for
the left intraction, while ensuring that the adversary does not recover the trapdoor for the right
interaction (as long as the right interaction has a different identity than the left interaction).
The idea is to have a protocol where the trapdoor can be recovered by “rewinding” some specific
messages in the protocol—called “slots”—in a specific order which depends on the identity of the
interaction. Furthemore, the protocol should have the property that if this specific rewinding order
is not the rewinding order actually used, then a trapdoor cannot be recovered. So, if we rewind the
left interaction according to the rewinding order corresponding to the identity of the left interaction,
this will still not enable the adversary to recover the trapdoor corresponding to the right interaction
(unless the identity of the right interaction is the same as the identity of the left interaction). In
our particular instantiation of this idea, the trapdoor will be a “signature-chain” (i.e., a signature
on a signature on a signature, etc.) of length n (i.e., the identity lenght) using different keys; the
choice of the keys in the signature chain are determined by the identity of the interaction. Next, the
protocol will have a “slot” for each of the keys where the receiver is willing to sign a single message
for the committer using the key corresponding to the slot. The key point is that the simulator is
able to rewind the slots in an appropriate order to recover a signature-chain corresponing to the
identity of the left interaction; but the rewindings will still not enable the adversary to recover a
signature-chain corresponding to any other identity.
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1.6 Open questions
• To use our proof technique we require the non-malleable commitment protocol to have at least
2 slots, and thus at least 4 messages. It is an intruiging open question whether we can base the
security of non-interactive, or even 2 message, protocols on a more standard assumption than
the one given in [PPV08]. In fact, even the problem of getting non-interactive commitment
scheme from one-way function is still open.
• The question of obtaining a truly practical construction of a non-malleable commitment
based on a standard assumption is open as well. A step in this direction would be to get
a constant-round black-box construction of non-malleable commitments based on one-way
functions: Whereas our protocols have black-box proofs of security, the constructions itself
use the underlying one-way function in a non-black-box way; that is, in the construction
we rely on a Cook reduction. In contrast, Wee [Wee10] (building partially on ideas from
[CDSMW09, PW09]) shows a O(log∗ n)-round black-box construction of commitment scheme
based on one-way functions, that satisfies a somewhat weaker notion of non-malleability.
This notion of non-malleability, however, suffices for the application to secure multi-party
computation, and as a result, Wee [Wee10] obtains a O(log∗ n)-round black-box construction
of secure multi-party computation based on a number of underlying primitives. We have not
yet investigated whether techniques from [CDSMW09, PW09, Wee10] can be applied also to
our protocol; we leave this for future work.
• Very recently, Canetti, Lin and Pass [CLP10] introduced an even stronger notion of security for
commitment schemes: CCA, or Chosen-Commitment-Attack, security. Roughly speaking, a
commitment scheme is CCA-secure if the hiding property of the commitments using identity
id remain hiding even if the receiver has oracle access to a decommitment oracle for any
commitment using a different identity. It is easy to see that CCA-security implies concurrent
non-malleability. [CLP10] provide a construction of anO(n)-round CCA-secure commitment.
Our construction does not seem to be CCA-secure, but we believe that our techniques might
be useful for improving the round-complexity also for CCA-secure commitments; we leave
this for future work.
1.7 Outline
In Section 2, we provide some preliminaries. In Section 3, we provide an overview of our protocol
construction and its security proof. In Section 4 we provide some formalizations and results abouts
“signature-chains”. Our protocol (which relies on the notion of a signature chain) is presented in
Section 5. We provide the proof of (stand-alone) non-malleabilty in Section 6; in Section 7 and 8,
we demonstrate that our protocol is also concurrent non-malleable, and can be made r-robust for
any constant r.
2 Preliminaries
Let N denote the set of all positive integers. For any integer n ∈ N , let [n] denote the set
{1, 2, . . . , n}, We denote by {0, 1}n the set of binary strings of length n, and {0, 1, 2}n the set of
trinary strings of length n. Given a binary (or trinary) string ψ of length n, we denote by [ψ]i1
the prefix of ψ of length i. We denote by PPT probabilistic polynomial time Turing machines.
We assume familiarity with interactive Turing machines, denoted ITM, interactive protocols, and
computational indistinguishability; the formal definitions of interactive protocols and comutational
indistinguishability are provided in Appendix A. Given a pair of ITMs, A and B, we denote by
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〈A(x), B(y)〉(z) the random variable representing the (local) output of B, on common input z and
private input y, when interacting with A with private input x, when the random tape of each
machine is uniformly and independently chosen.
2.1 Signature Schemes
We focus on fixed-length signature schemes Π = (Gen, Sign, V er), that is, the signing algorithm
Sign on input 1n, a public key pk and a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, always outputs a signature of length
n. We refer the reader to [Gol04] for a formal definition. Such signature schemes can be constructed
relying on universal one-way hash functions [NY89], which in turn can be based on any one-way
function [Rom90]. Below, a signature scheme always refers to a fixed-length signature scheme.
2.2 Commitment Schemes
Commitment schemes are used to enable a party, known as the sender, to commit itself to a value
while keeping it secret from the receiver (this property is called hiding). Furthermore, the commit-
ment is binding, and thus in a later stage when the commitment is opened, it is guaranteed that
the “opening” can yield only a single value determined in the committing phase. In this work, we
consider commitment schemes that are statistically-binding, namely while the hiding property only
holds against computationally bounded (non-uniform) adversaries, the binding property is required
to hold against unbounded adversaries. We refer the reader to [Gol01] for a formal definition.
Two-round (i.e., a single message from the receiver followed by a single message from the
committer) commitment schemes are known to exist based on the minimal assumption of one-way
functions [Nao91, HILL99]. In the sequel of the paper, a commitment scheme always refers to a
statistically-binding commitment.
Tag-based Commitment Scheme. Following [PR05a, DDN00], we consider tag-based commit-
ment schemes where, in addition to the security parameter, the committer and the receiver also
receive a “tag”—a.k.a. the identity—id as common input.
2.3 Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments
We recall the definition of concurrent non-malleability from [LPV08]. For convenience, we use a
slightly different presentation (based on indistinguishability rather than simulation); equivalence
follows using a standard argument (c.f. [GM84, PR05a]). Let 〈C,R〉 be a tag-based commitment
scheme, and let n ∈ N be a security parameter. Consider a man-in-the-middle adversary A (as
shown in figure 1) that, on inputs n and z (where z is received as an auxiliary input), participates
in m left and right interactions simultaneously. In the left interactions the man-in-the-middle
adversary A interacts with C, receiving commitments to values v1, . . . , vm, using identities of length
n, id1, . . . , idm ∈ {0, 1}n, of its choice. In the right interactions A interacts with R attempting to
commit to a sequence of related values v˜1, . . . , v˜m, again using identities of length n i˜d1, . . . , i˜dm of
its choice. If any of the right commitments are invalid, or undefined, its value is set to ⊥. For any i
such that i˜di = idj for some j, set v˜i = ⊥—i.e., any commitment where the adversary uses the same
identity as one of the left interactions is considered invalid. Let mimA〈C,R〉(v1, . . . , vm, z) denote a
random variable that describes the values v˜1, . . . , v˜m and the view of A, in the above experiment.
Definition 1. A commitment scheme 〈C,R〉 is said to be concurrent non-malleable (with respect
to itself) if for every polynomial p(·), and every PPT man-in-the-middle adversary A that par-
ticipates in at most m = p(n) concurrent executions, the following ensembles are computationally
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AC R
Com(vm)
Com(vi)
Com(v1)
Com(v˜m)
Com(v˜i)
Com(v˜1)
·· ·
·· ·
·· ·
·· ·
Figure 1: A concurrent man-in-the-middle adversary.
ACom(v) Com(v˜) ACom(v)
Com(v˜m)
Com(v˜i)
Com(v˜1)
·· ·
·· ·
A
Com(vm)
Com(vi)
Com(v1)
Com(v˜)
·· ·
·· ·
(i) one-one (ii) one-many (iii) many-one
Figure 2: Restricted man-in-the-middle adversaries.
indistinguishable.{
mimA〈C,R〉(v1, . . . , vm, z)
}
n∈N,v1,...,vm∈{0,1}n,v′1,...,v′m∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗{
mimA〈C,R〉(v
′
1, . . . , v
′
m, z)
}
n∈N,v1,...,vm∈{0,1}n,v′1,...,v′m∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗
We also consider relaxed notions of concurrent non-malleability: one-one, one-many, and many-
one secure non-malleable commitments (See Figure 2 below.) In a one-one (a.k.a., a stand-alone
secure) non-malleable commitment, we consider only adversaries A that participate in one left and
one right interaction; in one-many, A participates in one left and many right, and in many-one, A
participates in many left and one right.
As shown in [LPV08], any protocol that is one-many non-malleable is also concurrent non-
malleable.
Proposition 1 ([LPV08]). Let 〈C,R〉 be a one-many concurrent non-malleable commitment. Then,
〈C,R〉 is also a concurrent non-malleable commitment.
2.4 Robustness: Non-Malleability w.r.t. k-round Protocols
The concept of non-malleability is traditionally only considered in a setting where a man-in-the
middle adversary is participating in two (or more) executions of the same protocol. We here
consider a notion of non-malleability with respect to arbitrary k-round protocols. Below, we recall
the definition of k-robustness from [LP09].
Consider a one-many man-in-the-middle adversary A (as shown in figure 3) that participates in
one left interaction—communicating with a machine B—and many right interactions—acting as a
committer using the commitment scheme 〈C,R〉. As in the standard definition of non-malleability,
A can adaptively choose the identities in the right interactions. We denote by mimB,A〈C,R〉(y, z) the
random variable consisting of the view of A(z) in a man-in-the-middle execution when communicat-
ing with B(y) on the left and honest receivers on the right, combined with the values A(z) commits
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AB(y)
Com(v˜m)
Com(v˜i)
Com(v˜1)
·· · ·· ·
·· ·
Figure 3: A concurrent man-in-the-middle adversary with respect to protocol B on input y.
to on the right. Intuitively, we say that 〈C,R〉 is one-many non-malleable w.r.t B if mimB,A〈C,R〉(y1, z)
and mimB,A〈C,R〉(y2, z) are indistinguishable, whenever interactions with B(y1) and B(y2) cannot be
distinguished.
Definition 2. Let 〈C,R〉 be a commitment scheme, and B a PPT ITM. We say the commitment
scheme 〈C,R〉 is one-many non-malleable w.r.t. B, if for every two sequences {y1n}n∈N and {y2n}n∈N ,
y1n, y
2
n ∈ {0, 1}n, such that, for all PPT ITM A˜, it holds that{
〈B(y1n), A˜(z)〉(1n)
}
n∈N,z∈{0,1}∗
≈
{
〈B(y2n), A˜(z)〉(1n)
}
n∈N,z∈{0,1}∗
then it also holds that, for every PPT one-many man-in-the-middle adversary A,{
mimB,A〈C,R〉(y
1
n, z)
}
n∈N,z∈{0,1}∗
≈
{
mimB,A〈C,R〉(y
2
n, z)
}
n∈N,z∈{0,1}∗
We say that 〈C,R〉 is one-many k-robust if 〈C,R〉 is one-many non-malleable w.r.t. any machine
B that interacts with the man-in-the-middle adversary in k rounds.
3 Proof Overview
To explain the main ideas behind our construction, we here focus on outlining the construction
of a constant-round non-malleable commitment scheme that is secure for synchronizing and non-
aborting adversaries; we next comment on how to deal with general adversaries. An adversary is
said to be synchronizing if it “aligns” the left and the right executions; that is, whenever it receives
message i on the left, it directly sends message i on the right, and vice versa. An adversary is said
to be non-aborting if it never sends any invalid messages in the left interaction (where it is acting
as a receiver); it might still send invalid messages on the right.
As mentioned in the introduction, the idea is to have a protocol with an “identity-based trap-
door” embedded into it. The trapdoor will be a “signature-chain” using a sequence of keys that
are determined by the identity of the protocol. More precisely, we say that (σ0, σ1, . . . , σn) is a
plain signature chain2 with respect to the signature scheme Π, the verification keys vk0, vk1 and
the pattern ψ ∈ {0, 1}n if σ0 = 0 and for all 0 ≤ i < n, σi+1 is a signature on the message (i, σi)
with respect to the key vkψi+1 . For convenience of notation, for the remainder of this section we
fix a particular signature scheme Π; all signatures we use are with respect to this this particular
scheme.
The following simple claim regarding signature chains will be useful. Consider a “signature
game” where an adversary A gets access to two randomly chosen verification keys vk0, vk1 and
additionally has access to signature oracles with respect to vk0 and vk1; let ϕ denote the “access
2We use the name “plain signature chain” (instead of just “signature chain”), since the actual signature chains
we will use in the final construction will be a bit more complicated.
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pattern” of the adversary to the signature oracle (that is, if the i’th oracle call is to the signature
oracle w.r.t. vkb, then ϕi = b). The claim now is that, with overwhelming probability, if in the
signature game, A manages to output a plain signature chain with respect to vk0, vk1 and pattern
ψ, then ψ is a substring of ϕ.
The protocol for committing to a string v with identity id proceeds as follows:
• Slot 1: The receiver R generates a key-pair (sk0, vk0) for the signature scheme Π, and sends
vk0 to the committer C. C next send a random message r0 to R who signs r0 and then
returns the signature to C.
• Slot 2: R generates another key-pair (sk1, vk1) and sends vk0 to the committer C. As in
Slot 1, C next send a random message r1 to R who signs r1 and then returns the signature
to C.
• Commit phase: C commits to v using a standard statistically binding commitment.
• Proof phase: C gives R a “special-purpose”3 witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge
of the fact that it either knows the value committed to in the commit phase, or that it knows
a plain signature chain with respect to vk0, vk1 and id.
We now turn to argue that this protocol is non malleable with respect to non-aborting and
synchronizing adversaries. For simplicity, we here focus only on one-one (i.e., stand-alone) non-
malleability (but the same proof actually also works for concurrent non-malleability). Consider a
man-in-the-middle adversary A that uses identity id on the left and identity i˜d 6= id on the right,
and receives a commitment to the value v on the left. We will argue that no matter what the value
of v is, the values it commits to on the right will be indistinguishble. Towards this goal, consider a
hybrid experiment where the left interaction is simulated by acting honestly in Slot 1 and 2, next
committing to 0, and finally using a “fake-witness”—namely a signature chain—in the proof phase;
the simulator obtains this fake witness by simply rewinding Slot 1 and 2 (that is, to rewinding slot
b, we restore the state of A after vkb has been sent, and send a new message to be signed) in the
appropriate order to obtain a signature chain with respect to id (note that since A is non-aborting,
each time the simulator asks it to sign a message, it does). To show the above claim, we now argue
that no matter what the value of v is, the value A commits to on the right in the real execution
(when receiving a commitment to v), is indistinguishable from the value it commits to on the right
when the left interaction instead is simulated.
The key-point of the proof is the claim that even in the simulation, A cannot use a fake-witness
in the right interaction. This follows from the fact that since A is synchronizing, when we rewind
Slot 1 and 2 on the left, the same slots are rewound on the right in exactly the same order. Thus, by
the signature-game claim, if A manages to get a signature chain it must be a subset of the pattern
01id (the reason we need to append 01 is that A gets 2 signatures in the honest emulation of Slot
1 and 2, already before we start the rewindings). So, if we appropriately restrict the identity set
(for instance, by requiring that all identities start with 10) then the only valid identity that is a
substring of 01id is id, and thus i˜d = id, which is a contradiction.
To argue that the value committed to on the right does not change when we move from the real
interaction to the simulation, consider an intermediary hybrid where we only change the witness
used in the proof phase (but keep the value committed to in the commit phase to v). Note
that by the witness indistinguishable property of the proof phase, we have that the view of the
adversary is indistinguishable when we make this switch, but since the value committed to on the
right cannot be efficiently recovered, this does not directly imply that the committed value also is
3We will shortly explain what makes this proof special.
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indistinguishable. One way of resolving this problem would be to (in analogy with [PR05a]) have
the proof phase be statistically witness indistinguishable; but this requires additional assumptions
(to keep it constant-round). Instead, we here rely on an idea from [LP09]: we let the proof phase
consist of multiple sequentially ordered witness indistinguishable special-sound proofs. This allows
us to change the witness in each of the proofs, one by one, while ensuring that the witness on
the right can be extracted from some other proof, without rewinding the left proof where the
witness currently is being changed. Since the witness used in the right interaction cannot be a
fake witness (by the key-claim above), the witness used in all of the sequential right proofs must
the commitment information for the commit phase, and thus if the committed value on the right
changes, we contradict the witness indistinguishability of one of the sequentially ordered proofs.
Finally, we simply have to argue that the value on the right does not change once we change
the value committed to in the commit phase on the left. This again easily follows since the witness
on the right can be extracted from the proof phase, and again by the key-claim above, this witness
contains the value committed to in the commit phase, so indistinguishability of the committed
value follows from the hiding property of the the left commitment.
Dealing with aborting adversaries: When considering aborting adversaries, we run into two
obstacles:
• The adversary might notice that the simulator is feeding it signature chains to sign (instead of
random messages) and thus decide to abort the left execution. We handle this by adapting the
definition of a signature chain: instead of requiring the chain to be “a signature on a signature
on a signature... etc”, we require a signature-chain to be a signature on “a commitment of a
signature on a commitment of a signature... etc”. And next, in the protocol, we let C send
commitments to 0 instead of random strings. To be able to establish an analog of the above
signature-game claim, we additionally require C to give a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
of the value it committed to before R agrees to sign it.
• Another problem is that A might abort the left execution with some probability p. This means
that we might have to rewind the left execution many times (roughly 1/p times) before getting
the signature we are looking for. As a consequence, the ”access pattern” on the right will be
a substring of 01id∗1id
∗
2 . . . id
∗
n. To get around this problem, we add an additional slot (and a
corresponding signature key). Next, we require that the signature-chain corresponding to the
identity id to be with respect to the pattern 2id12id22id3 . . . 2idn.
Dealing with non-synchronizing adversaries: As is usually the case, synchronizing adversaries
are the ”hardest” to deal with it. If A is not synchronizing there exists some slot that is never
rewound and so if the identity of the right interaction contains at least two 0’s and two 1’s, we can
still establish the above key-claim, and the same proof still goes through.
4 Signature Chains and Games
Let Π = (Gen, Sign, V er) be a fixed-length signature scheme, and com a statistically-binding
commitment scheme. For simplicity of notation, we keep these schemes fixed, and provide our
definitions and protocols with respect to those particular schemes. Furthermore, for simplicity of
exposition, we assume that com that is non-interactive; however, all of our definitions and protocols
can be easily modified to work with any two-round statistically-binding commitment schemes; see
Remark 2 for further details.
We now turn to formally defining the notion of a signature-chain and then proceed to defining
signature-games.
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Definition 3 (Signature-Chain). Let ` ∈ N , ψ ∈ {0, 1, 2}` and vk0, vk1, vk2 ∈ {0, 1}∗ be three
verification keys for the signature scheme Π. We say that a triplet δ = (σ¯, c¯, r¯) is a signature-chain
w.r.t. keys vk0, vk1, vk2 and pattern ψ, if σ¯, c¯, and r¯ are vectors of length ` satisfying the following
properties.
• For all i ∈ [`], σ¯i is valid signature of the message c¯i under key vkψi, i.e., V er(vkψi , σ¯i, c¯i) = 1.
• For all 1 < i ≤ `, c¯i is a commitment to the tuple (i− 1, σ¯i−1) using com and randomness r¯i;
and c¯1 is a commitment to 0
m using com and randomness r¯1, where m = log `+ n.
We say that a signature-chain δ = (σ¯, c¯, r¯) has length ` if |σ¯| = l.
We proceed to define a signature-game SGA,`(n, z), where A on input 1n, z interacts with a
Challenger in the following three stages:
Stage 1: the Challenger samples three pairs of signing and verification keys at random, (skb, vkb)←
Gen(1n), where b ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and sends A the verification keys, vk0, vk1, and vk2.
Stage 2: A interacts with the Challenger in a sequence of iterations for as long as it wishes.
Iteration i proceeds as follows:
• A sends the Challenger a tuple (ϕi, c), where ϕi ∈ {0, 1, 2}, followed by a 5-round
ZKAOK proof of the statement that c is a valid commitment of com.
• if the proof is convncing, the Challenger signs the commitment c using the signing key
sϕi and returns the signature to A; otherwise, it aborts the iteration (without giving
back a signature).
Stage 3: Finally, A outputs the tuple (δ, ψ).
We call the sequence ϕ = ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . of signing request, the “access pattern” of A. We say that the
output of A is well-formed if δ is a length l(n) signature-chain with respect to vk0, vk1, vk2 and ψ.
Finally, we say that A wins if its output is well-formed at ψ is not a substring of its access pattern
ϕ (and looses otherwise).
Lemma 1. For every PPT adversary A and every polynomial `, there exists a negligible function
µ, such that for every n ∈ N, z ∈ {0, 1}∗, the probability that A wins in SGA,`(n, z) is at most µ(n).
Proof. Consider any adversary A, polynomial `, n ∈ N , and z ∈ {0, 1}∗. Without loss of generality,
we can assume that A always outputs tuples (δ = (σ¯, c¯, r¯), ψ) such that |σ¯| = |c¯| = |r¯| = ψ| = l(n)
(since whenever it doesn’t it loses). For each i ∈ [l(n)], define the random variable Ii to be the
index of the first iteration (in Stage 2 of the game SGA,`(n, z)) in which A queries the Challenger
for a signature of the commitment c¯i under key vψi ; if A never queries the Challenger for a signature
of c¯i, Ii is set to ⊥.
Note that if the output of A is well-formed, it contains a signature-chain δ = (σ¯, c¯, r¯) w.r.t.
pattern ψ, such that for every i, σ¯i is a valid signature of c¯i under key vψi . It thus follows from the
unforgibility of the signature scheme that, except with negligible probability, for each i, A must
have queried c¯i for a signature of vψi in some iteration. We thus have the following claim.
Claim 1. For every PPT adversary A and polynomial `, there exists a negligible function µ1,
such that for all n ∈ N, z ∈ {0, 1}∗, the probability that the output of A in SGA,`(n, z) is of A is
well-formed and there exists an i ∈ [`(n)] such that Ii = ⊥, is smaller than µ1(n).
We also have the following claim.
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Claim 2. For every PPT adversary A and polynomial `, there exists a negligible function µ2, such
that, for all n ∈ N, z ∈ {0, 1}∗, the probability that the output of A in SGA,`(n, z) is well-formed
and there exists an i ∈ [`(n)−1] such that , Ii 6= ⊥, Ii+1 6= ⊥ and Ii ≥ Ii+1, is smaller than µ2(n).
Before proceeding to the proof of Claim 2, we let us first prove Lemma 1 using Claim 1 and 2.
It follows from the two claims that, except with negligible probability, either the output of A is
not well-formed, or the output is well-formed and for all i, Ii 6= ⊥ and Ii < Ii+1. In the former
case, the adversary loses the game. In the latter case, as Ii 6= ⊥ for all i, A must have ask for a
signature using key vψi in the Iith iteration, which means ϕIi = ψi. Furthermore, as Ii < Ii+1 for
all i, it follows that ψ is a substring of ϕ. Therefore, A loses in this case as well. Thus, except with
negligible probability, A looses.
Proof of Claim 2. First notice that it follows from the (statistical) binding property of com, that
except with negligible probability4, if the output (δ = (σ¯, c¯, r¯), ψ) of A is well-formed, then for all
i, c¯i 6= c¯i+1, since c¯i, c¯i+1 are respectively commitments to tuples of the form (i, ·) and (i + 1, ·).
It follows that, except with negligible probability, if the output of A is well-formed, there doesn’t
exists some i such that Ii, Ii+1 6= ⊥ but Ii = Ii+1. Thus, it suffices to bound the probability that
the output of A is well formed and there exists some i such that Ii, Ii+1 6= ⊥ and Ii > Ii+1.
Towards this, assume for contradiction that there exists an adversary A and a polynomial `,
such that there exists a function i : N → N and a polynomial p, such that for infinitely many
n ∈ N, z ∈ {0, 1}∗, the probability that the output of A in the game SGA,`(n, z) is well-formed,
Ii, Ii+1 6= ⊥, and Ii > Ii+1 for i = i(n), is at least 1/p(n). We can construct a machine B that
violate the unforgibility of the signature scheme Π.
B, on input 1n, z and a randomly generated verification key vk, has access to the signing oracle
corresponding to vk, and tries to forge a signature (of vk) as follows: it internally emulates an
execution of the signature game SGA,`(n, z) with A honestly, with the following exceptions:
• In Stage 1, it picks an index t ∈ {0, 1, 2} at random and forwards the verification key vk to
the adversary as the tth verification key.
• In Stage 2, whenever A requests a signature of a message m under key vk, it obtains such a
signature from the signing oracle and forwards it to A.
Furthermore, it guesses that Ii = u and Ii+1 = k, for random u > k. Then, in the kth
iteration (in Stage 2 of SGA,`(n, z)), after receiving a request from A to sign the commitment
c, it extracts out the value (j, σ∗) committed to in c from the ZKAOK that A provides
following the signing request. Later, in the uth iteration, when A submits a query c∗ to the
Challenger, it checks whether σ∗ is a valid signature of c∗ under key vk. If so, it halts and
outputs the message-signature pair (c∗, σ∗); otherwise, it halts and outputs fail.
By construction, B emulates the view of A in the signature game SGA,`(n, z) perfectly before it
halts. Therefore, by our hypothesis, with probability at least 1/p(n), in emulation by B, A would
query for the first time the commitments c¯i and c¯i+1 in iterations Ii and Ii+1 respectively, such
that Ii+1 < Ii and c¯i+1 is a commitment to a tuple (i + 1, σ¯i+1), where σ¯i+1 is a signature of c¯i
under the verification key vψi . Let M(n) be the maximum number of iterations in the game; M is
polynomially bounded since the running-time of A is. With probability at least 1q(n) =
1
3M(n)2p(n)
,
it holds that (1) the above event occurs in the emulation by B and (2) B correctly guesses the
values of Ii, Ii+1 and vψi . In this case, except with negligible probability, the committed value σ∗
that B extracts out from the ZKAOK following c = c¯i+1 contains a valid signature of c¯i, which is
4Since we assume that com is non-interactive, we actually have perfect binding, but given that we want an analysis
that works also for two-round commitments, we here directly consider the more general case of statistical binding.
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queried for the first time in the uth iteration for a signature using key vk. Hence B will output a
valid message-signature pair (c¯i, σ
∗) for vk, without querying the signing oracle c¯i (since once the
query c¯i is submitted for the first time in iteration u, B halts immediately and outputs the pair);
this violates the unforgibility of the signature scheme Π.
5 The Protocol
Let Π = (Gen, Sign, V er) be a fixed-length signature scheme, and com a non-interactive statistically-
binding commitment scheme, as defined in the last section. Our constant-round concurrent non-
malleable commitment 〈C,R〉 is a tag-based commitment scheme, where the identities are from a
domain D` that consists of all `-bit binary strings that contains at least two 0-bits and two 1-bits.
(We rely on this restriction on the domain of the identities to simplify the proof of concurrent non-
malleability; see Case 2 in Section 6 for details.) To commit to a value v, the Committer and the
Receiver of 〈C,R〉, on common input a security parameter 1n (in unary) and an identity id ∈ D`,
proceed in the following three stages:
Stage 1: The receiver interacts with the Committer in three iterations, where iteration i ∈ {0, 1, 2}
proceeds in the following steps:
1. the Receiver generates a pair of signing and verification keys, (si, vi)← Gen(1n), of the
signature scheme Π, and sends the verification key vi.
2. the Committer commits to 0m, wherem = log `+n, using com. Let ci be the commitment
sent.
3. the Committer proves that ci is a valid commitment of com, using a 5-round ZKAOK
protocol.
4. the Receiver signs the commitment ci using the signing key si, and sends the signature
θi generated.
Stage 2: the Committer commits to the value v using com. Let c′ be the commitment generated.
Stage 3: the Committer proves the statement that
• either c′ is a valid commitment of com,
• or there exists a signature-chain δ w.r.t. v0, v1, v2 and pattern pattern(id), where the
function pattern : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1, 2}∗ maps a (binary) identity id of length ` to a trinary
string of length 2` as follows:
pattern(id) = 2, id1, 2, . . . , idi, 2, . . . , id`
This statement is proved using k + 5 sequential invocations of a 4-round WI special sound
proof system, where k is the number of messages in Stage 1 of the protocol.
In the rest of the paper, we sometimes refer to the last three steps of an iteration in Stage 1 as
a slot, which opens when the Committer send the com commitment to 0m, and closes when the
Receiver returns a signature of the commitment. We call the slot in iteration i, the slot i.
It is easy to see that the protocol 〈C,R〉 consists of a constant number of messages. Furthermore,
it follows using standard techniques that,
Proposition 2. 〈C,R〉 is a commitment scheme.
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Proof. We show that the 〈C,R〉 scheme satisfies the binding and hiding properties.
Binding: The binding property follows directly from the statistically binding property of com used
in Stage 2.
Hiding: The hiding property essentially follows from the hiding property of com and the fact
that Stage 3 of the protocol is WI (since WI proofs are closed under concurrent composi-
tion [FS90]). For completeness, we provide the proof. We show that any adversary R∗ that
violates the hiding property of 〈C,R〉 can be used to violate the hiding property of com. More
precisely, given any adversary R∗, such that, for infinitely many n ∈ N , and v1, v2 ∈ {0, 1}n,
R∗ distinguishes commitments to v1 and v2 made using 〈C,R〉, we construct a machine R′
that distinguishes commitments to v1 and v2 made using com. Note that the execution of a
commitment of 〈C,R〉 to v1 proceeds identically as that of a commitment to v2 before the
Stage 2 commitment of com is sent. Then by our hypothesis, there must exist a partial joint
view ρ of the committer and R∗ that determines the execution of the commitment before
Stage 2, such that, conditioned on ρ occurring, R∗ distinguishes commitments to v1 and v2.
Let δ be a valid signature-chain corresponding to the transcript of Stage 1 in ρ. R′ on aux-
iliary input ρ and δ proceeds as follows: it internally incorporates R∗, and feed R∗ its part
of view in ρ; it then forwards the external commitment made using com to R∗ in Stage 2;
in Stage 3, it gives WI proofs using δ as a “fake witness”. Finally, it outputs whatever R∗
outputs. From the WI property of Stage 3, it follows that R′ distinguishes the commitment
made using com, if R∗ distinguishes the commitment made using 〈C,R〉 conditioned on ρ
occurring.
Remark 2. The definition of the signature-games presented in Section 4 and the protocol 〈C,R〉
described in Section 5 uses a non-interactive statistically-binding commitment scheme. We show
that they can be modified to work with any two-round statistically binding commitment schemes
com. This is achieved by asking the receiver of the com commitments—that is, the Challenger
in the signature-game and the receiver R in the protocol 〈C,R〉—to send, at the beginning of the
execution, the first message r of a commitment of com; then in the rest of the execution, the other
player—that is, the adversary in the signature-game and the committer C in the protocol 〈C,R〉—
can simply use the second message of the com commitment, with the first message fixed to r, as
a non-interactive commitment scheme. (Additionally, in the last stage of the protocol 〈C,R〉, the
sender proves that either the Stage 2 message is the second message of a valid com commitment
with first message r, or it knows a signature-chain δ = (σ¯, c¯, r¯), such that, δ is well-formed as
described in the definition of the signature-chains, except that, for all i, c¯i is the second message
of a com commitment to σ¯i−1, generated in responding to the first message r using randomness
r¯i). Then it follows using the same proof as in Section 4 and Section 6 below (and the fact that
commitments of com are still hiding even if the first message is reused) that no efficient adversary
can win the modified signature-game with non-negligible probability, and that the modified protocol
is a concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme.
6 Proof of Non-malleability
In this section, we show that 〈C,R〉 is stand-alone non-malleable. In Sections 8 and 7, we extend
the proof to show that 〈C,R〉 is also robust and concurrent non-malleable.
Theorem 5. 〈C,R〉 is non-malleable.
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Proof. The goal is to show that for every one-one man-in-the-middle adversary A that participates
in one left and one right executions, the following ensembles are indistinguishable:{
mimA〈C,R〉(v1, z)
}
n∈N,v1,v2∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗{
mimA〈C,R〉(v2, z)
}
n∈N,v1,v2∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗
Towards this, we define a series of hybrid experiments H0, . . . ,Hk+6. In each of these experiments,
we show that the view of A, combined with the value that A commits to on the right, are in-
distinguishable. Below, we let hybi(v, z) denote the random variable describing the view of A(z),
combined with the value it commits to in the right interaction in hybrid Hi (as usual, the commit-
ted value is replaced with ⊥ if the right interaction fails or if A has copied the identity of the left
interaction).
Hybrid H0: The hybrid H0 emulates a real execution, mim
A
〈C,R〉(v, z), with A internally—we call
the emulated execution the Main Execution—and tries to extract a “trapdoor” of the left
interaction from A (if it completes Stage 1 of the left interaction successfully in the Main
Execution); by “trapdoor”, we mean a signature-chain δ w.r.t. v0, v1, v2 and pattern ψ =
pattern(idl), where idl and v0, v1, v2 are, respectively, the identity and the verification keys
that A chooses in the left interaction. More specifically, the Extraction Procedure proceeds in
|ψ| = 2` iterations, which are described inductively below.
Base Case—Iteration 1: If A successfully completes Stage 1 of the left interaction in the
Main Execution, it must have provided three valid signatures θ0, θ1, θ2 of commitments
to 0m, where m = log ` + n, under keys v0, v1, v2 respectively. Then since a signature-
chain with pattern ψ “starts” with a signature σ¯1 of a commitment to 0
m under key
vψ1 = v2, the procedure simply sets σ¯1 to θ2, c¯1 to the transcript of the commitment to
0m generated in iteration 2 (in Stage 1) of the left interaction, and r¯1 the randomness
used (by the left committer) in the commitment.
Induction Step—Iteration i+ 1: Assume that at the end of the ith iteration, for i ∈ [2`],
the procedure has obtained a signature-chain δi of length i w.r.t. (keys v0, v1, v2 and)
pattern [ψ]i1, containing signatures σ¯1, . . . , σ¯i. Then in iteration i+ 1, it tries to obtain a
signature-chain δi+1 of length i+ 1, w.r.t. pattern [ψ]
i+1
1 , by rewinding the appropriate
slot in Stage 1 of the left interaction. More precisely, the procedure repeatedly rewinds
A from where the left-slot ψi+1 opens in the Main Execution, and commits to A the
tuple (i, σ¯i) (instead of 0
m) in the rewindings, until this left-slot is closed successfully,
i.e., A returns a valid signature of a commitment to σ¯i under key vψi+1 in the slot.
Then the extraction procedure simply sets σ¯i+1 to this signature, (and sets c¯i+1 and r¯i+1
appropriately).
At the end of the 2` iterations, the procedure obtains a valid signature-chain δ = δ2` = (σ¯, c¯, r¯)
w.r.t v0, v1, v2 and pattern ψ, which is a valid “trapdoor” of the left interaction. (Actually,
the extraction procedure is cut-off if it runs for “too long” (more than 2n steps), in which
case a “trapdoor” is computed using brute force search.)
Since the view of A in the Main Execution in H0 is emulated perfectly as in mim
A
〈C,R〉(v, z).
We have that the view and the value A commits to in H0 is identically distributed to that in
the real execution, that is:
Claim 3. For every PPT adversary A, it holds that:{
mimA〈C,R〉(v, z)
}
n∈N,v∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗
=
{
hyb0(v, z)
}
n∈N,v∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗
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Hybrid H1 to Hk+5: In hybrids H1 to Hk+5, we change the witness used in the k + 5 WISSP
proofs in Stage 3 of the left interaction. More specifically, the experiment Hi proceeds identi-
cally to Hi−1, except that in the first i proofs in Stage 3 of the left interaction, we prove that
there exists a signature-chain w.r.t. v0, v1, v2 and pattern pattern(idl), by using the extracted
“trapdoor” δ as a “fake” witness. We show that the view and the committed value of the
right interaction in Hi−1 and Hi are indistinguishable.
Proposition 3. For every PPT adversary A, and every function i : N → N , it holds that:{
hybi(n)−1(v, z)
}
n∈N,v∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗
≈
{
hybi(n)(v, z)
}
n∈N,v∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗
Towards this, we reduce the indistinguishability of {hybi(n)−1(v, z)} and {hybi(n)(v, z)} to
the witness indistinguishabilty of the Stage 3—More specifically, given an adversary A, a
function i, and a polynomial p, such that, (for infinitely many n ∈ N , inputs v ∈ {0, 1}n
and z ∈ {0, 1}∗,) hybi−1(v, z) and hybi(v, z) for i = i(n) are distinguishable with probability
1/p(n). Then we show that there exists a PPT machine B that can violate theWI property
of the WISSP protocol 〈P, V 〉 used in Stage 3 of the protocol.
On a high-level, the machine B, on common input 1n and auxiliary input v, z, interacts
externally with an honest prover P and receives a left-interaction Stage 3 proof, generated
using either the real witness w0—the decommitment of the Stage 2 commiment in the left
interaction—or the fake witness w1—the “trapdoor” of the left intearction. Internally, B
emulates an execution of either hybi−1 or hybi with A (depending on the witness used in
the external proof), except that, messages in the ith proof in Stage 3 of the left interactions
are fowarded externally. Furthermore, if right interaction is successful and has a different
identity from the left, B attempts to extract the committed value, via rewinding theWISSP
proofs in Stage 3 of the right inteaction. However, since the ith left-proof is forwarded
externally, the rewinding has to be done in a manner that does not “affect” the ith left-
proof. Roughly speaking, this is possible since there are more WISSP proofs in Stage 3 of
the right interaction, than the number of messages in the ith left-proof. Therefore, in the
right interaction, there exist someWISSP proofs that does not interleave with any messages
in the ith left-proof, and B can use rewindings to extract a witness without rewinding the left-
proof. (The actual rewinding strategy also avoids rewinding Stage 1 of the left interaction, so
that, the “trapdoor” δ of the left interaction extracted from the Main Execution remains to
be a valid “trapdoor” in the rewindings, and can be reused to simulate the left interaction in
the rewindings. This is possible again because there are more (concretely, k+ 5) right-proofs
than the number of messages in Stage 1 and the ith proof in the left interaction (that is,
k + 4).) Finally, B outputs the emulated view of A, together with the value committed to
in the right interactions, if the witness extracted is the valid decommitments to the right
interactions. Otherwise, if B fails to extract a witness for some right interaction, or if the
witness extracted from the right interaction is not a valid decommitment, it outputs fail1 and
fail2 respectively. See Figure 4 for a formal description of B. Below in Lemma 2, we show
that the running-time of machine B is “bounded”, in the sense that the probability that B
runs for super-polynomial time is negligible.
Lemma 2. There exists a polynomial function T , such that, for every polynomial function
q, every b ∈ {0, 1}, every sufficiently large n ∈ N , and inputs v ∈ {0, 1}n and z ∈ {0, 1}∗,
the probability that machine B runs for more than q(n)T (n) steps in an execution of the
experiment STAb(〈P, V 〉, B, v, z) is smaller than 1/q(n).
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Description of B
Input: B receives a security parameter 1n and auxiliary inputs v and z.
Procedure: B interacts externally with a prover P of theWISSP protocol 〈P, V 〉, and receives
a proof of a statment x using witness w0 or w1, where x, w0 and w1 are all chosen adaptively by
B. Internally, it proceeds in the following three phases:
Simulation Phase: Emulates an execution of the experiment hybi−1(v, z) or hybi(v, z) with A
internally, except that, messages in the ith left-proof of the Main Execution are forwarded
externally to P . More precisely, at the beginning of the ith left-proof, B sends the external
prover the statement x of the ith proof, together with the real witness w0 = (v, r) (the
decommitment of the Stage 2 commitment of the left interaction) and the “fake” witness
w1 = δ (the “trapdoor” of the left interaction extracted from A) to P , and then forwards
the proof of x generated by P using either w0 or w1 to A as the i
th left-proof. Let ∆ be the
simulated view of A in the Main Execution.
Rewinding Phase: If the right interaction is successful and has a different identity from the left
interaction in ∆, extract the value committed to in this interaction as follow:
• Find the first WISSP proof (α1, α2, β, γ) in ∆, such that, during its the execution,
no messages belonging to Stage 1 or the ith proof of the left interaction are exchanged.
(Such a WISSP proof must exist since there are k + 5 WISSP proofs, whereas only
k + 4 messages in Stage 1 and the ith proof of the left interaction.)
• Rewinds the proof by sending new random challenges β′ until a second transcript
(α1, α2, β
′, γ′) is obtained.
In the rewindings, emulate the left and right interaction for A the same as in the Main
Execution, except that, whenever A expects a new message in Stage 1 or the ith proof
of the left interaction, cancel the execution and start a new rewinding again.
• If βρ 6= β′ρ, extract witness w from (α1, α2, β, γ) and (α1, α2, β′, γ′). Otherwise halt and
output fail1.
• If w = (v, r) is valid decommitment for the right interaction, then set vˆ = v. Otherwise
halt and output fail2.
Output Phase: If the right interaction that is not convincing or the identity of the right inter-
action is the same as the left interaction, set vˆ =⊥. Output vˆ and ∆.
Figure 4: The construction of B
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We remark that Lemma 2 does not bounds the running-time of B in the worst case (in fact, in
some executions, it may take 2n steps); neither does it bound the running-time in expectation.
However, it does imply that for any polynomially small probability 1/q(n), B runs in some
fixed polynoimial time with at least probability 1−1/q(n), which, as shown later, is sufficient
for the purpose of our proof. A formal proof of Lemma 2 can be found in Section 6.1.
Next, we proceed to analyze the output distribution of B. Let STAb(〈P, V 〉, B, v, z), where
b ∈ {0, 1}, denote the output of B after receiving a proof generated using witness wb. Then,
we show that,
Lemma 3. The following indistinguishability holds.
{STA0(〈P, V 〉, B, v, z)}n∈N,v∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗ ≈
{
hybi−1(v, z)
}
n∈N,v∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗
{STA1(〈P, V 〉, B, v, z)}n∈N,v∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗ ≈
{
hybi(v, z)
}
n∈N,v∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗
By construction, B emulates the view of A in hybi−1(v, z) perfectly when receiving an external
proof generated using the real witness w0, and that in hyb
i(v, z) when receiving a proof
generated using the fake witness w1. Therefore, to show Lemma 3, it suffices to show that
B (almost) always extracts a valid decommitment of the right interaction, if it is successful
and has a different identity from the left interaction5, or equivalently, the probability that B
outputs fail1 or fail2 is negligible.
Claim 4. There exists a negligible function µ, such that, for every b ∈ {0, 1}, every sufficiently
large n ∈ N , and inputs v ∈ {0, 1}n and z ∈ {0, 1}∗, the probability that B outputs fail1 in
STAb(〈P, V 〉, B, v, z) is smaller than µ(n).
Proof. Recall that after the Main Execution, if the right interaction is successful and has a
different identity from the left interaction, B attempts to extract the committed value, by
finding the appropriate WISSP proof, (α1, α2, β, γ), in Stage 3 of this right interaction, and
repeatedly rewinding the proof until a second transcript (α1, α2, β
′, γ′) is obtain. Then, by the
special soundness of the proof, B never fails to extract the witness, unless β = β′. Therefore,
to bound the probability that B outputs fail1, it suffices to show that the probability that B
picks any challenge message twice during its execution is negligible.
Assume for contradiction that B picks some challenge twice with polynomial probability
1/p(n). Then by Lemma 2, there exists a polynomial T2p, such that, for sufficiently large
n ∈ N , the probability that B takes more than T2p(n) steps is smaller than 1/2p(n). Hence,
if we cut the execution of B after T2p steps, the probability that it picks some challenge
twice is still at least 1/p(n)− 1/2p(n) = 1/2p(n). However, in this case, B picks at most T2p
challenges. Since the length of each challenge is n, by applying the union bound, we obtain
that the probability that a challenge is picked twice is at most 2n(
T2p
2n )
2 =
T 22p
2n , which gives a
contradiction.
Claim 5. There exists a negligible function µ, such that, for every b ∈ {0, 1}, every sufficiently
large n ∈ N , and inputs v ∈ {0, 1}n and z ∈ {0, 1}∗, the probability that B outputs fail2 in
STAb(〈P, V 〉, B, v, z) is smaller than µ(n).
5By the statistically binding property of the protocol 〈C,R〉, the decommitment extracted contains the unique
committed values of the right interactions, except with negligible probablity.
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Next we proceed to prove Claim 5. Assume for contradiction that there exists a polynomial
g(n), such that, with probability 1/g(n), B extracts an invalid decommitment from the right
interaction. Towards reaching a contradiction, we consider another machine B′, which pro-
ceeds identically to B except that it cuts the execution off after T ′(n) = 2g(n)T (n) steps
(and outputs ⊥ in this case). It follows from Lemma 2 that the probabilty that B runs for
more than T ′(n) steps is at most 1/2g(n). Therefore, the probabiity that B′ extracts out an
invalid decommitment from the right interaction k is at least 1/2g(n). Furthermore, by the
WISSP property of the right-proofs, if the witness is not a valid decommitment, it must be
a signature-chain δ w.r.t. the right-interaction keys v′0, v′1, v′2 and pattern pattern(idr). Then,
consider the following two possible adversarial schedulings w.r.t. the left and the kth right
interactions in the Main Execution:
Scheduling 1: A “aligns” the slots in the left and right interactions one by one, where a
right-slot is aligned with a left-slot if (1) its corresponding verification key is sent before
the left-slot opens, and (2) its openning message (i.e., the commitment from A) is sent
after the left-slot opens. See Figure 5 (i).
Scheduling 2: A does not align the slots in the left and right interactions. See Figure 5 (ii).
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(i) Scheduling 1 (ii) Scheduling 2
Figure 5: The two schedulings of the messages in Stage 1 of the left and right interactions.
Since Scheduling 1 and 2 are the only two possible schedulings, by our hypothesis, at least
one of the following two conditions holds.
Condition 1: The probabilty that Scheduling 1 occurs in the Main Execution and that B′
extracts an invalid decommitment from the right interaction is non-negligible.
Condition 2: The probabilty that Scheduling 2 occurs in the Main Execution and that B′
extracts an invalid decommitment from the right interaction is non-negligible.
However, below we reach a contradiction when either of the conditions holds.
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If Condition 1 holds, the left and right slots in the Main Execution are aligned one by one.
Therefore, whenever the tth left-slot is rewound, the adversary A may request for a new
signature of key v′t on the right, and furthermore may only request for a signature of v′t. Then
since the left-slots are executed (in the Main Execution) and then rewound (during extracting
the left “trapdoor”) in the folloiwng sequence
ϕ = 012‖(idl)∗1, 2∗, . . . , (idl)∗i , 2∗, . . . , (idl)∗`
in the right interaction, A may only request signatures of keys v′0, v′1, v′2 in the pattern ϕ.
However, the witness that B′ extracts out from the right interaction is a signature-chain δ
w.r.t. (keys v′0, v′1, v′2 and) pattern pattern(idr), which is not a substring of ϕ (as idr 6= idl),
which contradicts the soundness of the signature game (Lemma 1). More precisely, given
B′, we construct another machine C that externally participates in a signature game, while
internally simulates an execution of STAb(〈P, V 〉, B′, v, z) honestly, except that, messages in
Stage 1 of the right interaction k are simulated by fowarding the appropriate messages from
the signature games to A. In particular, C forwards the three verification keys vk0, vk1, vk2
in the signature game to A as the verification keys in Stage 1 of the right interaction; and
whenever A requests a signature of one of the three keys, C obtains such a signature from the
signature game and forwards it to A. (Furthermore, C aborts if Scheduling 1 does not occur
in the Main Execution.) Then by construction of C and the argument above, we have that
C uses access pattern ϕ in the signature game, but is able to extract out a signature-chain
w.r.t. pattern(idr), which is not a substring of ϕ. This violates Lemma 1.
If Condition 2 holds, (since Scheduling 2 occurs in the Main Execution,) there exists a right-
slot t that is not aligned with any left-slots. Therefore during the rewindings of the left-slots,
A never sends a new request for a signature of key v′t, and obtains only one signature of key v′t
in the whole execution. On the other hand, the witness extracted from the right interaction
is a signature-chain δ w.r.t. pattern ψ = 2, (idr)1, . . . , 2, (idr)`. Since idr ∈ D` contains at
least two 0 and two 1 bits, no matter what value t is, there are at least two (trinary) bits in
ψ, say the j1
th and the j2
th, that are equal to t. Therefore the signature-chain δ contains two
different signatures of key v′t: one is a signature of a commitment to a tuple of form (j1, ∗),
and the other of form (j2, ∗), which violates the unforgibility of the signature scheme.
Combining Lemma 3 and 2, we show that B violates the WI property of the Stage 3 proofs.
It first follows from our hypothesis and Lemma 3 that the outputs of B after receiving
a Stage 3 proof using a “real” or a “fake” witness are distinguishable with probability at
least 2/3p(n). Furthermore, it follows from Lemma 2 that, there exists fixed polynomial
T ′′(n) = 3p(n)T (n), such that, the probability that B runs for more than T ′′(n) steps is at
most 1/3p(n). Therefore, the outputs of B are still distinguishable with probability at least
1/3p(n), even if we cut its execution off after T (n) steps (and output ⊥ if B fails to complete
in T (n) steps). This violates the WI property of 〈P, V 〉, and we conclude the proposition.
Hybrid Hk+6 : Hybrid Hk+6 proceeds identically to Hk+5 except that the Stage 2 commitment of
the left execution is emulated by committing to 0n. It follows using the same argument as in
hybrids Hi, for i ∈ [k+ 5], that the committed value of the right interaction can be extracted
without rewinding Stage 2 of the left interaction. It then follows from the hiding property of
the Stage 2 commitment that the combined view and values committed to by A in Hk+5 are
indistinguishable from those in Hk+6.
It follows by a hybrid argument that,{
mimA〈C,R〉(v, z)
}
n∈N,v∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗
≈
{
hybk+6(v, z)
}
n∈N,v∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗
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Since the above holds for every value v, we have{
mimA〈C,R〉(v1, z)
}
n∈N,v1,v2∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗
≈
{
hybk+6(v1, z)
}
n∈N,v1,v2∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗
, and{
mimA〈C,R〉(v2, z)
}
n∈N,v1,v2∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗
≈
{
hybk+6(v2, z)
}
n∈N,v1,v2∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗
Finally, since by the definition of hybk+6, it holds that for every v1, v2 and z, hybk+6(v1, z) =
hybk+6(v2, z), we conclude that,{
mimA〈C,R〉(v1, z)
}
n∈N,v1,v2∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗
≈
{
mimA〈C,R〉(v2, z)
}
n∈N,v1,v2∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗
6.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of Lemma 2. The running-time of B consists of three parts:
Part 1—Time spent in simulating the Main Execution: Since A runs in strict polynomial
time, the time B spends in the Main Execution is poly(n).
Part 2—Time spent in extracting the left “trapdoor”: We show below in “Analysis of Part
2” that there exists a polynomial T2(n) such that for every polynomial q2, (every b ∈ {0, 1},
every sufficiently large n ∈ N , and inputs v ∈ {0, 1}n, z ∈ {0, 1}∗,) the probability that B
spends more than T2(n)q2(n) steps on extracting the left “trapdoor” in STAb(〈P, V 〉, B, v, z)
is smaller than 1/q2(n).
Part 3—Time spent in extracting the right committed values: We show below in “Anal-
ysis of Part 3” that there exists a polynomial T3(n) such that for every polynomial q3, the
probability that B spends more than T3(n)q3(n) steps on extracting the left “trapdoor” in
STAb(〈P, V 〉, B, v, z) is smaller than 1/q3(n).
Then given an arbitrary polynomial q, by setting q2(n) = q3(n) = 2q(n), we obtain that, for every
sufficiently large n ∈ N , the probability that B spends more than 2q(n)T2(n) in part 2 or more
than 2q(n)T3(n) steps in part 3 is smaller than 1/q(n). Therefore, overall, for sufficiently large
n ∈ N , the probability that B runs for more than T (n) = poly(n) + 2q(n)T2(n) + 2q(n)T3(n) steps
is smaller than 1/q(n).
Analysis of Part 2: Recall that in an execution of STAb(〈P, V 〉, B, v, z), the extraction of the
left “trapdoor” proceeds in 2` iterations, in which the first iteration simply sets δ1 = (σ¯1, c¯1, r¯1) to
the appropriate signature, committed value, and random string used in the left interaction of the
Main Execution. Therefore, it suffices to analyze only the time spent in the rest of the iterations.
In an iteration i > 1, B takes the signature-chain δi−1 = ([σ¯]i−11 , [c¯]
i−1
1 , [r¯]
i−1
1 ) of length i− 1, w.r.t.
(keys v0, v1, v2 and) pattern [ψ]
i−1
1 , (where ψ = pattern(idl),) obtained in the previous iteration,
and extends it to a signature-chain σ¯i of length i w.r.t. pattern [ψ]
i
1. This is done by repeatedly
rewinding A from the start of the left-slot ψi and committing to (i − 1, σ¯i−1) in the rewindings,
until A closes this left-slot successfully, in which case, the extraction procedure obtains a valid
signature of a commitment to (i − 1, σ¯i−1) under key vψi . (Below we assume for simplicity that
the extraction procedure is never cut-off and may run for more than 2n steps, since this only
increases the running time). Towards bounding the running-time of this extraction procedure, we
first consider a hypothetical procedure, which proceeds almost the same as the actual extraction
procedure, except that, in the rewindings in iteration i > 1, instead of committing to (i− 1, σ¯i−1),
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it commits to 0m. In other words, the hypothetical procedure simulates the view of A in the
rewindings identically to that in the Main Execution. We show that the expected running-time
of this hypothetical procedure is poly(n), based on which we then bound the running-time of the
actual extraction procedure.
Running-time Analysis of the hypothetical procedure: Let ψ = pattern(idl) be the pattern of the
“trapdoor” of the left intearction. In iteration i > 1, the hypothetical extraction procedure re-
peatedly rewinds the left-slot ψi; let T i be the random variable that describes the time spent in
rewinding the left-slot ψi in iteration i > 1. We show that E[T
i] ≤ poly(n) and then by linearity
of expectation, we conclude that the expected running-time of the hypothetical procedure is
2∑`
i=2
E[T i] ≤
2∑`
i=2
poly(n) ≤ poly(n),
since both the number of iterations is poly(n).
Now we bound E[T i]. Let Γψi denote the set of prefixes ρ—i.e., partial transcripts of the Main
Execution—from where the left-slot ψi opens. Given a prefix ρ ∈ Γψi , we introduce the following
notations:
• let Pr [ρ] denote the probability that ρ occurs as a prefix in the Main Execution.
• let pρ denote the probability that, conditioned on the prefix ρ occurring (in the Main Execu-
tion), the left-slot ψi closes successfully in the Main Execution.
Take any ρ from Γψi . We claim that conditioned on ρ occurring, the expected value of T
i—denoted
as E[T i|ρ]—is poly(n). This follows since, first, the hypothetical procedure starts rewinding the left-
slot ψi in iteration i, only if this slot closes successfully in the Main Execution—hence, (conditioned
on ρ occurring,) the probability the left-slot ψi is rewound is at most pρ—and second, once it starts
rewinding the left-slot ψi, it continues until the slot closes successfully again—since the hypothetical
procedure proceeds identically in the rewindings as in the Main Execution, the probability that the
left-slot ψi closes successfully in any rewinding is also pρ, and thus, (conditioned on ρ occurring,)
the expected number of rewindings performed before this happens is 1/pρ. Therefore, the overall
expected number of rewindings from ρ is pρ × 1pρ = 1. As each rewinding takes at most poly(n)
steps, we conclude that E[T i|ρ] ≤ poly(n). Thus,
E[T i] =
∑
ρ∈Γψi
E[T i|ρ] Pr [ρ] ≤ poly(n)×
∑
ρ∈Γψi
Pr [ρ] ≤ poly(n)
Running-time Analysis of the actual extraction procedure: Given that the expected running time of
the hypothetical procedure is bounded by a polynomial T˜ (n), it follows using the Markov inequality
that, for every polynomial q2, (every b, every n ∈ N , and inputs v, z,) the probability that the
hypothetical procedure takes more than q2(n)T˜ (n)/2 steps is smaller than 2/q2(n). Then we claim
that the probability that actural extraction procedure takes more than q2(n)T˜ (n)/2 steps is smaller
than 1/q2(n). This follows since the only difference between the hypothetical and the actural
extraction procedures is that, in the former the rewindings are simulated by committing to 0m
using com, whereas in the latter rewindings are simulated by committing to a tuple that contains a
signature. Since the ZKAOK proof following the commitment is never rewound, it follows directly
from the hiding property of com and the zero knowledge property of the ZKAOK proof that, the
probability that the actual extraction procedure runs for more than q2(n)T˜ (n)/2 steps differs from
that of the hypothetical procedure by at most a negligible amount. Thus, for sufficiently large n, we
have that the probablity B spends more than T2(n) = q2(n)T˜ (n)/2 steps is smaller than 1/q2(n).
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Analysis of Part 3: We show that the time that B spends in the Rewinding Phase is bounded
by a polynomial T3(n) in expectation. Then, by the Markov inequality (as above) that, for every
polynomial q3, the probability that B takes more than q3(n)T3(n) steps is smaller than 1/q3(n).
It follows from the same argument as in the “running-time analysis of the hypothetical proce-
dure” that to bound the expected time spent in extracting the right committed value, it suffices
to bound the expected time spent in rewinding each right WISSP proof, since the total number
of right-proofs is poly(n). Then recall that a right-proof is rewound only if the proof completes
successfully in the Main Execution, without interleaving with any message in Stage 1 or the ith
proof of the left interaction. On the other hand, once the rewinding starts, it continues until this
right-proof completes successfully again, while cancelling every rewinding in which the proof inter-
leaves with any message in Stage 1 or the ith proof of the left interaction. Furthermore, as every
rewinding is simulated exactly the same as the Main Execution is, it follows using the same “p
times 1/p argument” as in the analysis of part 2 that the expected number of rewindings over a
right-proof is 1, and hence the expected time spent in extracting the right committed values is
bounded by a polynomial T3(n).
7 Proof of Concurrent Non-Malleability
One way to obtain a constant-round concurrent non-malleale commitment scheme is by relying
on the previous work [LP09], which presents a general compilation technique that can transform
any commitment scheme that is stand-alone non-malleable and one-many 4-robust, into another
one that is concurrently non-malleable and one-many 4-robust, while incurring only an (additive)
constant overhead to the round complexity of the protocol. Then since the protocol 〈C,R〉 is stand-
alone non-malleable and, as shown in the next section, also 4-robust, by relying on the previous
work [LP09], we directly obtain a constant-round concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme
(which is also 4-robust).
Next we show that, by extending the proof of stand-alone non-malleabilty in section 6, the
protocol 〈C,R〉 is already concurrently non-malleable. By Proposition 1, to show concurrent non-
malleability, it suffices to prove that 〈C,R〉 is one-many non-malleable, that is, for every one-many
man-in-the-middle adversary A, that participates in one left and many right interactions, the view
of A and the values it commits to on the right are indistinguishable, no matter what value it is
receiving a commitment to on the left. Towards this, we consider the same hybrid experiments
H0 to Hk+6 as in the proof of stand-alone non-malleability. It follows from almost the same proof
as before that the view of A and the values it commits to on the right are indisitnguishable in
sequential hybrids, except that, in hybrids H1 to Hk+6, we (or more precisely, the simulator B)
now need to extract out the values that A commits to in all the right interactions (recall that
the proof before relies on the fact that value that A commits to in the right interaction can be
extracted “efficiently”, to show the indistinguishability of hybrid Hi and Hi+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 6).
This is easy to achieve, since we can simply extract the values that A commits to in each right
interaction one by one, (using the same method as before,) after the Main Execution completes.
More precisely, in the Rewinding Phase, for every successful right interaction that has a different
identity from the left interaction in the Main Execution, B finds a WISSP proof in Stage 3 of
this right interaction that does not interleave with any message in Stage 1 and the ith proof (or
Stage 2 for hybrid Hk+6) of that left interaction, and repeatedly rewinds the proof until a second
transcript is obtain; it then computes a witness, if the two transcripts are different. Since there are
only polynomial number of right interactions, it follows using almost the same proof of Lemma 2
that the running time of B is “bounded”, and further using exactly the same proof of Lemma 3
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that, except with negligible probability, the witnesses that B extracts out are indeed the values
committed to in the right interactions. Thus by the WI property of the Stage 3 proofs (or the
hiding property of Stage 2 resp.), the view and the values committed to by A are indistinguishable
in hybrids Hi and Hi+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 4 (or in Hk+5 and Hk+6 resp.). Therefore, we conclude
that,
Theorem 6. 〈C,R〉 is concurrent non-malleable.
8 Proof of Robust Non-Malleability
In this section, we show that, for any r ∈ N , our constant-round (concurrent) non-malleable
commitment scheme 〈C,R〉 can be easily modified into a O(r)-round (concurrent) non-malleable
commitment scheme 〈C˜, R˜〉 that is additionally one-many r-robust.
It is shown in [LP09] that one-many r-robust commitment schemes are easy to construct: any
commitment scheme that is “extractable” and has more than r “rewinding slots” is directly one-
many non-malleable w.r.t. r-round protocols. Therefore, to make our constant-round non-malleable
commitment scheme 〈C,R〉 one-many r-robust, we simply add more WISSP proofs in Stage 3 of
the protocol. More precisely, the commitment scheme 〈Cr, Rr〉 proceeds identitcally to 〈C,R〉,
except that in Stage 3 of the protocol, the Committer C˜ needs to provide max(r + 1, l) WISSP
proofs (of the statement that either the Stage 2 message is a valid commitment or that it knows a
“trapdoor”), where l is the number of WISSP proofs in Stage 3 of the original protocol 〈C,R〉. It
follows using the same proof as in [LP09] that 〈Cr, Rr〉 is one-many r-robust. Roughly speaking,
the main idea of the proof is to reduce the one-many r-robustness to the indistinguishability of
the interaction with machine B(y1n) or B(y
2
n), by extracting the value committed to in the right
interactions from the WISSP proofs in Stage 3 of the protocol, without rewinding the left inter-
actions. This is achievable, (similar to the proof of the indistinguishability of Hybrid Hi and Hi+1
in Section 6,) as there are more WISSP proofs in Stage 3 than the nubmer of messages in the
left interaction, and one can always find a WISSP proof that does not interleave with the left
interaction and extract a witness from this proof, without rewinding the left interactions. The
witness extracted must be a valid decommitment, as otherwise, by the special-soundness of the
proof, it must be a valid signature-chain, which violates the soundness of the signature-game (since
the adversary here is never rewound and obtains only three signatures during the straight-line ex-
ecution of the right interaction). Therefore, we conclude that 〈Cr, Rr〉 is one-many r-robust. It
follows using the same proof in Section 6 that 〈Cr, Rr〉 is stand-alone non-malleable; and it further
follows using the same proof in Section 7 that it is, in fact, concurrent non-malleable. Therefore,
Lemma 4. For every r ∈ N , the protocol 〈Cr, Rr〉 has O(r)-round, and is concurrently non-
malleable and one-many r-robust.
Theorem 2 follows directly from Lemma 4. Furthermore, for r < l, the protocol 〈Cr, Rr〉 is the
same as 〈C,R〉, thus,
Corollary 1. For any r < l, 〈C,R〉 is concurrently non-malleable and one-many r-robust.
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A General Definitions
A.1 Witness Relations
We recall the definition of a witness relation for a NP language [Gol01].
Definition 4 (Witness relation). A witness relation for a language L ∈ NP is a binary relation
RL that is polynomially bounded, polynomial time recognizable and characterizes L by L = {x :
∃y s.t. (x, y) ∈ RL}
We say that y is a witness for the membership x ∈ L if (x, y) ∈ RL. We will also let RL(x)
denote the set of witnesses for the membership x ∈ L, i.e., RL(x) = {y : (x, y) ∈ L}. In the
following, we assume a fixed witness relation RL for each language L ∈ NP.
A.2 Indistinguishability
Definition 5 (Computational Indistinguishability). Let Y be a countable set. Two ensembles
{An,y}n∈N,y∈Y and {Bn,y}n∈N,y∈Y are said to be computationally indistinguishable (denoted by {An,y}n∈N,y∈Y ≈
{Bn,y}n∈N,y∈Y ), if for every PPT “distinguishing” machine D, there exists a negligible function
ν(·) so that for every n ∈ N, y ∈ Y :
|Pr [a← An,y : D(1n, y, a) = 1]− Pr [b← Bn,y : D(1n, y, b) = 1]| < ν(n)
A.3 Interactive Proofs
We use the standard definitions of interactive proofs (and interactive Turing machines) [GMR89]
and arguments (a.k.a. computationally-sound proofs) [BCC88]. Given a pair of interactive Turing
machines, P and V , we denote by 〈P (w), V 〉(x) the random variable representing the (local) output
of V , on common input x, when interacting with machine P with private input w, when the random
input to each machine is uniformly and independently chosen.
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Definition 6 (Interactive Proof System). A pair of interactive machines 〈P, V 〉 is called an inter-
active proof system for a language L if there is a negligible function ν(·) such that the following two
conditions hold :
• Completeness: For every x ∈ L, and every w ∈ RL(x), Pr [〈P (w), V 〉(x) = 1] = 1
• Soundness: For every x ∈ {0, 1}n−L, and every interactive machine B, Pr [〈B, V 〉(x) = 1] ≤
ν(n)
In case that the soundness condition is required to hold only with respect to a computationally
bounded prover, the pair 〈P, V 〉 is called an interactive argument system.
A.4 Zero-Knowledge
We recall the standard definition of ZK proofs. Loosely speaking, an interactive proof is said to be
zero-knowledge (ZK) if a verifier V learns nothing beyond the validity of the assertion being proved,
it could not have generated on its own. As “feasible” computation in general is defined though
the notion of probabilistic polynomial-time, this notion is formalized by requiring that the output
of every (possibly malicious) verifier interacting with the honest prover P can be “simulated” by
a probabilistic expected polynomial-time machine S (a.k.a. the simulator). The idea behind this
definition is that whatever V ∗ might have learned from interacting with P , he could have learned
by himself by running the simulator S.
The notion of ZK was introduced and formalized by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff in [GMR89].
We present their definition below.
Definition 7 (ZK). Let L be a language in NP, RL a witness relation for L, (P, V ) an interactive
proof (argument) system for L. We say that (P, V ) is statistical/computational ZK, if for every
probabilistic polynomial-time interactive machine V there exists a probabilistic algorithm S whose
expected running-time is polynomial in the length of its first input, such that the following ensembles
are statistically close/computationally indistinguishable over L.
•
{
〈P (y), V (z)〉(x)
}
n∈N,x∈{0,1}n∩L,y∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗
•
{
S(x, z)
}
n∈N,x∈{0,1}n∩L,y∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗
where 〈P (y), V (z)〉(x) denotes the view of V in interaction with P on common input x and private
inputs y and z respectively.
A.5 Witness Indistinguishability
An interactive proof (or argument) is said to be witness indistinguishable (WI) if the verifier’s
output is “computationally independent” of the witness used by the prover for proving the state-
ment. In this context, we focus on languages L ∈ NP with a corresponding witness relation RL.
Namely, we consider interactions in which, on common input x, the prover is given a witness in
RL(x). By saying that the output is computationally independent of the witness, we mean that
for any two possible NP-witnesses that could be used by the prover to prove the statement x ∈ L,
the corresponding outputs are computationally indistinguishable.
Definition 8 (Witness-indistinguishability). Let 〈P, V 〉 be an interactive proof (or argument) sys-
tem for a language L ∈ NP. We say that 〈P, V 〉 is witness-indistinguishable for RL, if for every
probabilistic polynomial-time interactive machine V ∗ and for every two sequences {w1n,x}n∈N,x∈L
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and {w2n,x}n∈N,x∈L, such that w1n,x, w2n,x ∈ RL(x) for every x ∈ L∩{0, 1}n, the following probability
ensembles are computationally indistinguishable over n ∈ N .
• {〈P (w1n,x), V ∗(z)〉(x)}n∈N,x∈L∩{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗
• {〈P (w2n,x), V ∗(z)〉(x)}n∈N,x∈L∩{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗
A.6 Proofs (Arguments) of Knowledge
Loosely speaking, an interactive proof is a proof of knowledge if the prover convinces the verifier
that it possesses, or can feasibly compute, a witness for the statement proved. The notion of a
proof of knowledge is essentially formalized as follows: an interactive proof of x ∈ L is a proof of
knowledge if there exists a probabilistic expected polynomial-time extractor machine E, such that
for any prover P , E on input the description of P and any statement x ∈ L readily outputs a valid
witness for x ∈ L if P succeeds in convincing the Verifier that x ∈ L. Formally,
Definition (Proof of knowledge [Gol01] ). Let (P, V ) be an interactive proof system for the language
L. We say that (P, V ) is a proof of knowledge for the witness relation RL for the language L it there
exists an probabilistic expected polynomial-time machine E, called the extractor, and a negligible
function ν(n) such that for every machine P ∗, every statement x ∈ {0, 1}n, every random tape
r ∈ {0, 1}∗ and every auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1}∗,
Pr
[〈P ′r(z), V 〉(x) = 1] ≤ Pr[EP ′r(x,z)(x) ∈ RL(x)] + ν(n)
consider PPT provers. An interactive argument system 〈P, V 〉 is an argument of knowledge if
the above condition holds w.r.t. probabilistic polynomial-time provers.
Special-sound WI proofs A 4-round public-coin interactive proof for the language L ∈ NP with
witness relation RL is special-sound with respect to RL, if for any two transcripts (δ, α, β, γ) and
(δ′, α′, β′, γ′) such that the initial two messages, δ, δ′ and α, α′, are the same but the challenges β, β′
are different, there is a deterministic procedure to extract the witness from the two transcripts
and runs in polynomial time. Special-sound WI proofs for languages in NP can be based on
the existence of 2-round commitment schemes, which in turn can be based on one-way functions
[GMW91, FS90, HILL99, Nao91].
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